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Abstract: Different approaches to the protection of sureties are currently taken in the 
European Union member states.  A consideration of these different levels of 
protection requires an examination of social welfare law, contract law and bankruptcy 
law.  This consideration is important because different approaches to surety protection 
represent potential barriers to the integration of the credit market, as envisaged under 
the draft Directive on consumer credit.  The draft Directive may eliminate some of 
these barriers, but not others.  In addition the Directive also has the potential to bring 
other, negative, consequences.  If the Directive is successful it may have a significant 
impact on the level of over-indebtedness among consumers and, consequently, there 
will be a need to monitor the adequacy of consumer bankruptcy laws in the member 




The protection of family sureties has been largely neglected in consumer legislation 
and literature in the European Union.1  Persons who have entered into surety 
agreements are however afforded protection through various means under the laws of 
the member states, in particular in contract law, although the scope of protection 
varies.  Sureties may benefit from forms of protection that are offered to consumer 
debtors generally, and from some other forms of protection specific to sureties.  It is 
helpful to consider the position of sureties by reference to their position within a 
framework of five broad categories of general consumer protection:  
1. General social welfare policy;  
2. Procedural protection, consisting of information provision and lender 
regulation;  
3. Provisions relating to the giving of consent to the contract; 
4. Regulation of the content of the contract; and  
5. Consumer bankruptcy.   
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The categories are presented in the chronological order in which they would normally 
take effect.  Naturally these categories of protection affect sureties in a different 
manner from principal consumer debtors.  The liability of a surety is triggered by the 
default of the principal debtor.  Therefore any forms of consumer protection, such as 
some bankruptcy systems, that enable the principal debtor to escape his obligations 
may result in liability for the surety.  In view of the difference in interests of the 
principal debtor and the surety there is a strong need for separate consideration of the 
place of the surety within the framework of protection.   
 
Current approaches to surety protection will be examined in part one (I) of this paper.  
The interrelationship between the categories of protection and differences in emphasis 
among the laws of the member states will be considered.  This consideration is 
particularly important in evaluating the potential impact of the draft Directive on 
consumer credit, for two main reasons.2  First, the current draft of the Directive omits 
consideration of many features of consumer protection in the member states, 
specifically the forms of protection in Categories 1, 3 and 5 and, possibly Category 4, 
so the potential for the different approaches of the member states under these 
categories of protection to act as barriers to the integration of the credit market must 
be examined, an issue that will be briefly dealt with in the second part (II).3  
Secondly, the impact of the Directive on the categories of protection must be 
examined.  The draft Directive, in implementing a ‘maximum harmonisation’ 
approach, will inevitably be the product of compromise, and there is therefore a 
danger that it will not be as effective as the systems of consumer protection in 
operation in some member states.  Certainly lenders will argue for a construction of 
the Directive that is least protective of sureties.  There is also a danger that, in 
interpreting provisions of the Directive that facilitate surety protection, the courts in 
the member states will be influenced by their existing norms regarding surety 
protection, prolonging the differences in protection offered even in spite of 
harmonisation.  A final point is that it will be particularly important to have a suitable 
scheme of protection in operation if the Directive succeeds in opening up the credit 
market.  On previous occasions when credit markets have been democratised there 
has been a rise in over-indebtedness.  It is therefore crucial that measures should be 
implemented to prevent aggressive and socially harmful lending from occurring in 
markets which have previously been largely resistant to it, and to eliminate it from 
markets where it already is present.  Moreover member states will need to review the 
likely ability of their bankruptcy laws to cope with a rise in instances of over-
indebtedness that may be predicted and to equip consumers with information to 
                                                 
2 Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the Harmonisation of the Laws, 
Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Credit 
for Consumers, Art. 9. 
3 Although they are merely one aspect of the fragmented nature of the credit market in 
Europe.  See generally N. JENTZSCH, ‘The Implications of the New Consumer 
Credit Directive for EU Credit Market Integration’ Freie Universität Berlin, John F. 
Kennedy Institute Position Paper April 22, 2003.  For a suggestion of an alternative 
way forward see K. LANNOO and A. DE LA MATA MUÑOZ, ‘Integration of the 
EU Consumer Credit Market, Proposal for a More Efficient Regulatory Model’ 
Centre for European Policy Studies Working Document No. 213/November 2004, 
<http://www.ceps.be>. 
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enable them to select the most appropriate form of credit to meet their needs.  These 
issues will be considered in part three (III). 
 
I. Differing approaches under the five categories of consumer 
protection 
Each of the categories of protection will be explained and selected differences in the 
form or content of these laws within Europe will be highlighted.  In addition the 
interrelationships of different categories of protection will be explained.  It will be 
seen that the present approaches of member states to the issue of surety protection are 
so divergent that they present significant obstacles to the integration of the credit 
market, as proposed under the draft Directive.4 
Category 1: General social welfare policy 
Social welfare policy relates to the material security of citizens and dictates how 
consumers must finance their basic needs.  This policy affects consumer finances in 
many ways, including the provision of housing; childcare resources; resources for 
caring for elderly relatives; a basic level of subsistence for those who are unemployed 
and even the provision of sufficient public transportation so that a car is not a 
necessity.  It is particularly important where the family structure of the consumer does 
not enable support to be given, and where the consumer does not have sufficient 
wealth at his disposal to fund his requirements.  For such consumers, if no social 
welfare support is provided, a need for credit may arise.  The lender may require this 
credit to be backed by a surety. 
 
In cases where limited social welfare support is available and the consumer has had to 
resort to credit that is subject to a suretyship agreement, events, such as the loss of a 
job or the birth of a child, can force the principal debtor to default, triggering liability 
for the surety.  The degree of social welfare support provided therefore has an indirect 
but important effect on the position of sureties since it is linked with the likelihood of 
default by the principal debtor.  The likelihood of default by the principal debtor will 
additionally be taken into account by lenders in agreeing the terms of the credit 
contract with the principal debtor in the first place.  The greater the risk of default, the 
greater the likelihood that a family member will be asked to enter into a contract of 
suretyship.  Changes in social welfare, leading to persons having to have more 
recourse to their own resources, and those of their families, may increase the chance 
that a contract of suretyship will be requested and that the principal debtor will 
default.  Therefore, the impact of this category of protection on sureties should not be 
overlooked.   
 
The impact of the system of social welfare on the fifth category of protection, 
bankruptcy, and to a lesser extent the fourth, substantive protection, needs to be 
considered.  There is a natural link between social welfare and bankruptcy, since both 
relate to general standards of living, providing a safety net in difficult times.  
Comparative bankruptcy lawyers have consistently pointed out the manner in which 
                                                 
4 For discussion of differing approaches under the laws of the member states see also 
A. COLOMBI CIACCHI, ‘Non-Legislative Harmonisation of Private Law Under the 
European Constitution: The Case of Unfair Suretyships’, in this volume. 
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countries’ bankruptcy systems are influenced by the social welfare system in that is in 
operation.5  They observe that the more generous the social welfare system, the more 
restrictive the bankruptcy system, and vice versa.  In this regard the social welfare 
system can have a significant indirect influence on the position of sureties.  Since this 
category of protection is so strongly linked with consumer bankruptcy, detailed 
consideration of the influence of social welfare on consumer protection will take place 
alongside the discussion of Category 5, consumer bankruptcy. 
 
However one further way in which social welfare affects surety protection should 
briefly be mentioned.  A certain level of social welfare is also provided under civil 
procedure rules, which may exempt certain assets from being seizable by creditors.  
The debtor is thereby guaranteed a minimal range of assets necessary for everyday 
living.  This safeguard may be used by lenders to argue that the debtor should thereby 
not be relieved of liability in cases where the debtor seeks transaction avoidance, on 
the basis that the debt is excessive, under one of the grounds mentioned under 
Category 4 below, which consider the proportionality of the burden placed on the 
surety.  However in evaluating such arguments it is necessary to consider the reasons 
why the surety entered into the agreement.  It is arguable that there should be no 
impact on the availability of relief if the circumstances of the transaction are unfair, in 
particular if there was a defect in the surety’s consent to the transaction, for example 
if it was entered into under a threat, or if the lender failed to observe a duty to advise 
the surety of the consequences of the agreement.  The general standard of living 
guaranteed under the welfare system can only be relevant in assessing the ability of 
the surety to pay liabilities that have been fairly incurred in the first place. 
 
Category 2. Procedural protection 
The main form of procedural protection implemented by the member states under this 
category consists of requirements for the provision of information.  Currently the 
member states place differing levels of requirements on contracting parties.  
Jurisdictions applying the duty of precontractual good faith have long required the 
provision of information as part of the process of contracting.6  A breach of the duty 
to inform can lead to the invalidity of a contract on the basis of mistake or fraud.7   
 
                                                 
5 See R. EFRAT, ‘Global Trends in Personal Bankruptcy’ (2002) 76 Am. Bankr. L.J. 
81, p. 96-98 for an overview of the relationship; and U. REIFNER, ‘’Thou Shalt Pay 
Thy Debts’ Personal Bankruptcy Law and Inclusive Contract Law’ in J. Niemi- 
Kiesiläinen, I. Ramsay and W.C. Whitford (eds), Consumer Bankruptcy in Global 
Perspective, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2003, p. 144. 
6 See further S. VAN ERP, ‘The Pre Contractual Stage’ in A. Hartkamp, M. 
Hesselink, E. Hondius, C. Joustra and E. du Perron (eds), Towards a European Civil 
Code Kluwer Law International, Nijmegen, 2nd edn, 1997; and M. W. HESSELINK, 
‘The Concept of Good Faith’ in M. W. HESSELINK, The New European Private 
Law, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2002, p. 203, citing sources including 
Cass. Com., 8 November 1983, Bull. Civ. IV, no. 298, p. 260 (France); and HR, 30 
November 1973, NJ 1974, 97. 
7 M. W. HESSELINK, above n. 6 at 204. 
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The existing consumer credit Directive includes some Category 2 requirements.8  For 
example it requires advertisements offering credit, or credit arranging services, to 
include, in addition to the rate of interest or the cost of credit, a statement of the 
annual percentage rate.9 In addition it requires the credit agreement to be in writing 
and to include information on matters including the cash price, any deposit provided, 
and the effect of early repayment.10  Further protection in this category relates to the 
licensing, inspection and monitoring of credit providers.11  However these provisions 
lack specific reference to sureties.  The draft Directive will extend the procedural 
protection that is offered to sureties, although, as will be discussed later, in quite 
limited fashion.12 
 
The approach to the protection of sureties in England is heavily based around 
Category 2 protection, in keeping with the general approach under UK law where the 
courts do not normally tend to consider the fairness of the transaction from a 
substantive perspective,13 although under recent reform proposals, outlined below, it 
may become easier for sureties to attack agreements that are unfair in substance.14  
The English case law however does appear to offer a lower threshold of avoidance 
than some Continental systems, and more flexible remedies.15  The bulk of surety 
protection cases in England have been considered under the law of undue influence.  
Although the approach under this law originally centred on defects of consent, the 
courts subsequently refined the applicable principles by establishing a set of 
procedural steps to be followed by lenders.  The law has therefore arguably shifted 
                                                 
8 Council Directive 87/102/EEC of 22 December 1986 for the Approximation of the 
Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning 
Consumer Credit, hereafter ‘Consumer Credit Directive’, Arts 3-7. 
9 Consumer Credit Directive, above n. 8, Art. 3. 
10 Consumer Credit Directive, above n. 8, Art. 4 and Annex. 
11 Consumer Credit Directive, above n. 8, Art. 12. 
12 See Part II, below.  Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Harmonisation of the 
Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning 
Credit for Consumers, Art. 2 e-f, 10 and 23. 
13 Although the case law approach is largely procedural there is a substantive element 
to banking practice.  Under the Banking Code, a voluntary code of good banking 
practice, it is provided that banks should not accept an unlimited guarantee: British 
Bankers’ Association, The Building Societies Association and the Association for 
Payment Clearing Services (March 2003), para. 13.4.  If, however, an unlimited 
guarantee is required, in spite of this, the bank is required to consider whether any 
solicitor with proper regard to the wife’s interests would advise her to sign such an 
agreement: Royal Bank of Scotland plc v. Etridge (No 2) [2001] 4 All ER 449, HL, at 
para. 112. 
14 See note 31, and accompanying text, below. 
15 See below under the heading ‘Remedies’.  In Scotland the avoidance of suretyship 
agreements, which are termed ‘caution’ agreements, has been achieved in similar 
circumstances to the English jurisdiction under the requirement of fair dealing in good 
faith. Smith v. Bank of Scotland, Mumford v. Bank of Scotland 1997 SC (HL) 110. 
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from Category 3 to Category 2.16  The case law17 on undue influence provides that a 
bank should be put on notice in cases where the relationship between borrower and 
surety is ‘non commercial’ in nature.  In such a case the bank should communicate 
with the surety informing him or her that the bank will require written confirmation 
from a solicitor that the nature of the suretyship and its effect has been explained.  
The bank should explain also that the purpose of this requirement is to prevent the 
surety from later being able to dispute that the suretyship agreement is binding on 
them and should request that the surety nominates a solicitor to provide advice.  The 
bank should not proceed with the transaction unless it has received an appropriate 
response from the surety.  Alternatively, if the bank does not provide the required 
explanation, it should provide the solicitor with information to enable proper advice to 
be given to the surety: the bank should obtain the permission of the borrower for the 
provision of this information and if this permission is not given this should put the 
bank on notice.  If, however, there are further circumstances which lead the bank to 
believe that the prospective surety is not acting according to his or her free will they 
should share their concerns with the solicitor.  Whichever approach is taken to 
advising the surety, written confirmation should be obtained from the solicitor that the 
documents and their nature have been explained.  If these requirements of advice have 
not been observed the contract can be set aside.   
 
At this stage it is helpful to consider how Category 2 protection may limit the need for 
laws under Categories 3, defects of consent, and 4, substantive protection.  It could be 
argued that the more information that is provided to consumers, including sureties, 
before they enter into the contract the less need there is for protection under Category 
3 and, in particular, Category 4.  An approach based heavily on the provision of 
information might assume that freedom of contract should reign unchecked.  The 
contracting parties have entered into a bargain; in doing so they were in full 
possession of information; therefore their decision to enter into the contract is rational 
and principled, and they should be held to their bargain.  However the case law 
surrounding sureties provides ample evidence that the provision of information 
regarding the transaction may still be insufficient.  Sureties will still enter into 
disadvantageous transactions through family loyalty or vulnerability.  In cases where 
the surety has given defective consent, they may be able to invoke protection under 
Category 3.  However, under a particularly altruistic approach, it might be argued that 
the law should contain Category 4 protection so that the substantive fairness of 
contracts can be regulated and that there should be some measures available to assist 
persons who make bad decisions even in spite of being in possession of full 
information and where the transaction cannot be attacked on defect of consent 
grounds.  In practice, however, laws in the member states tend to be based on a 
combination of Category 3 and 4 protection, that is, they tend to require both for there 
to have been a defect in the surety’s consent and for the transaction to have been 
unfair to the surety in substance.   
                                                 
16 Although the surety may be able to rely on some other form of Category 2 
protection, such as duress, in cases where the correct procedures have been followed 
and the protection of undue influence is unavailable. 
17 Royal Bank of Scotland plc v. Etridge (No 2) [2001] 4 All ER 449, HL.  For a 
discussion of the implications of this case see D. MORRIS, ‘Surety Wives in the 
House of Lords: Time for Solicitors to ‘Get Real’?” 11 FemLS (Feminist Legal 
Studies) 2003, p 57. 
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Category 3. Defects of consent 
The member states’ legal systems contain laws to enable persons who have given 
defective consent to a contract to obtain relief.18  Such laws may be of assistance to 
sureties, depending on the circumstances.  Similar basic categories of protection 
appear in the jurisdictions considered.  However the form and content of such laws 
varies so that it cannot realistically be claimed that there is a common system in place.  
Relevant laws will briefly be discussed by reference to the laws of selected member 
states.   
 
Firstly, a contract that has been entered into under duress or by influence of threats 
can commonly be avoided under the contract laws of the member states, although the 
formulations of these laws differ.  Where a suretyship contract is entered into under 
duress, or the influence of threats, the circumstances mean that the surety either could 
not have appreciated the importance of the information that was provided in 
connection with the transaction, or that he entered into the contract regardless of the 
risk of liability.  For example, for such a claim to be made out in England, the surety 
will need to establish that there was an application of illegitimate pressure by the 
other contracting party; and that the surety had no option but to comply with the 
demands of the party exerting pressure.19.  Similarly in Germany,20 the Netherlands,21 
Italy22 and France23 a person whose declaration of will has been illegitimately 
obtained by means of threats can obtain relief, although the criteria that must be met 
can differ, in particular in relation to the conduct that the lender must have engaged in 
and the extent of disadvantage that the surety must have suffered.24   
 
Further protection is commonly provided under the law of mistake or error.25  Under 
the Netherlands law, for example, the amount of information that has been provided 
to the surety prior to the contract being concluded will be highly relevant to a claim of 
                                                 
18 For an overview of relevant laws in selected countries, and suggestions as to how 
such laws could be unified, see M. FABRE-MAGNAN, ‘Defects of Consent in 
Contract Law’ in A. Hartkamp et al (eds), above n. 6. 
19 See for example Atlas Express v. Kafco Ltd [1989] 1 All ER 641; Pao On v. Lau 
Yiu Long [1980] AC 614, PC. 
20 BGB §123. 
21 Netherlands Civil Code, 3:45. 
22 Codice Civile, Art. 1434. 
23 Civil Code, Art. 1112. 
24 For a general discussion see H. KÖTZ, European Contract Law, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1997, at p. 209 ff.   
25 For example in France Art. 1118 Code Civil, Cour d’appel Paris 18 January 1977, 
JPC G (La semaine juridique, edition générale), II, 19318, note P. SIMLER, appr. 
Cour de Cassation, Cass. 4 July 1979, D, (Receuil Dalloz Sirey) 1979, p. 538.  
Discussed in C. LEBON, ‘Vorlagebeschluss of June 29, 1999 – The Protection of 
“Vulnerable Sureties” as to German, French, Belgian, Dutch, English and Scottish 
Law’, 2&3 ERPL (European Review of Private Law) 2001, p 417, at 422-3, who also 
notes that the courts in France can be reluctant to annul contracts of suretyship on 
grounds of error.  Netherlands Art. 6:228 CC; German BGB §§119 and 120; Italian 
Codice Civile, Arts 1428-1433.  
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mistake.  Protection is also widely available where the transaction is fraudulent26 or, 
in England, if there was a misrepresentation.27 
 
In addition vulnerable persons commonly enjoy protection.28  The provision of 
information will not enable a vulnerable surety to make a rational decision because 
their characteristics make them incapable of doing so.  The Netherlands Civil Code, 
for example, permits relief where there has been an abuse of circumstances.  This law 
will assist a surety, although it is not confined to sureties, where the lender knows or 
should know that the surety is being induced to enter into an agreement on account of 
special circumstances, generally relating to vulnerability, and where they promote the 
conclusion of the agreement even though what they know, or ought to know, should 
prevent them from doing this.  The circumstances of vulnerability include a state of 
necessity and dependency.  It would include relationships where the emotional bond 
means that consent is not freely given. 
 
Category 4: Regulation of the content of the contract 
Provisions that enable the courts to interfere with the substance of the terms that the 
parties to a contract of suretyship have agreed have clear potential to undermine 
commercial certainty.  Therefore such laws are used sparingly and, within the member 
states, the laws falling under this category vary in scope.  Some protection applies 
where the suretyship agreement contains financial obligations that are 
disproportionate to the financial means at their disposal, to an extent that they have 
little hope of repaying the debt.  A fair amount of overlap with Category 3 protection 
is observable, since many of the laws that the member states have developed that 
enable the regulation of the substance of surety agreements require also some element 
of a defect of consent. 
 
In Scandinavia broad powers are granted to judges to police the substantive fairness 
of contracts.29  The courts in that group of countries therefore have potentially greater 
powers to provide protection to sureties who have entered into unfair agreements than 
courts in the other member states.  In contrast, it has been noted that UK contract law 
does not normally consider the substantive fairness of contracts but rather 
                                                 
26 For example, in France Civil Code Art. 1116, dol; Germany BGB §123, arglistige 
Täuschung; Netherlands Civil Code 3:44, bedrog. 
27 Misrepresentation Act 1967.  See D.K. ALLEN, Misrepresentation, Sweet and 
Maxwell, London, 1988. 
28 For example in the UK, Infants’ Relief Act 1874; Gallie v. Lee [1971] AC 1004 
(non est factum); in the Netherlands, Civil Code Art. 45 of Book 3, misbruik van 
omstandigheden (abuse of circumstances), including protection for persons of 
abnormal mental condition or inexperience; and German BGB §104. 
29 See J. PÖYHÖNEN, ‘Procedural and Substantive Fairness in Finnish Contract 
Law’ in R. Brownsword, G. Howells and T. Wilhelmsson (eds), Welfarism in 
Contract Law, Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1994, at pp. 199-206; T. WILHELMSSON 
‘Standard Form Conditions’ in A. Hartkamp et al (eds), above n. 6, at p. 262, citing 
Nordic Contracts Acts, sec. 36; T. WILHELMSSON, Critical Studies in Private Law.  
A Treatise on Need-Rational Principles in Modern Law, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1992, p. 
180; and Perspectives of Critical Contract Law, Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1993, p. 23. 
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concentrates on the circumstances of the contracting process.30  Under proposed 
reforms, however, the ability of the UK courts to provide relief against unfair 
suretyships is likely to increase. 
 
These reforms would increase the scope of the substantive protection that may be 
obtained under the Consumer Credit Act 1974.  This Act targets agreements which 
either31 require the debtor to make payments which are, or were, ‘grossly exorbitant; 
or which otherwise grossly contravene the ‘ordinary principles of fair dealing’.  These 
terms set a high threshold for debtors seeking protection, and indeed very few debtors 
have been able to have agreements set aside under the 1974 Act.  Reform proposals 
have however been announced and a draft Bill has been produced which will enable 
consumers to obtain protection where their relationship with the lender is ‘unfair’, 
potentially a significantly easier standard to satisfy.  In addition the Bill contains 
measures that are designed to make it easier for debtors to bring their cases.  Under 
the 1974 Act the surety, or the debtor, must take his case to court, entailing a 
potentially long and expensive process.32  It has been found that in many cases 
complaints are not made where there are legitimate grounds for the adjustment of 
transactions.33  Under the Bill it will be possible for debtors and sureties to take their 
case to an independent ombudsman.  A further major drawback of the 1974 Act is that 
it only relates to credit agreements of a value up to £25,000 and so it will not apply to 
most suretyship agreements.34  However it is proposed that this financial restriction 
should be removed.35 
 
Usury laws provide a common means of protection for debtors by prohibiting 
agreements at an excessive rate of interest.36  Such laws are relevant to the position of 
sureties if the suretyship contract includes provision for the payment of an excessive 
rate of interest on the amounts owing under the contract.  In addition an excessive 
interest rate increases the likelihood of default by the principal debtor and thereby the 
likelihood that the surety will be called upon.  In the assessment of interest rates a 
balance needs to be achieved between protecting the debtor, on the one hand, and 
facilitating credit on the other hand.  Lenders with excessive interest rates will argue 
that the excessive interest rate is justified on account of the risk presented by the 
debtor.37   
 
Usury laws are particularly important for vulnerable debtors, who are liable to 
exploitation in imperfect markets.  They are unable, in the same manner as more 
sophisticated debtors, to shop around for credit.  The ability to charge interest in an 
unfettered manner creates an incentive for creditors to charge excessive rates.  Interest 
                                                 
30 See the text accompanying n. 13, above. 
31 Consumer Credit Act 1974, sec. 138(1). 
32 Consumer Credit Act 1974, sec. 139(1). 
33 See L. BENTLY and G. HOWELLS, Loansharks and Extortionate Credit Bargains 
2 Conv. (Conveyancer and Property Lawyer) 1989, p 234, at 235. 
34 Consumer Credit Act 1974, sec. 8(2). 
35 Consumer Credit Bill, sec. 2(1)(b). 
36 For example the Consumer Credit Act 1974, sec. 138(1); §138(2) BGB (Germany). 
37 For example in the UK it was decided that an interest rate ceiling should not be 
introduced, on the basis that such a law could represent a barrier to low income 
borrowers and could encourage them to seek credit from illegal lenders. 
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rate caps are a feature of the majority of legal systems in the member states, although 
the UK government, in outlining its reforms to consumer protection laws, concluded 
that a similar law should not be introduced in the UK, preferring for usurious 
contracts to be attacked under the general standard of unfairness, rather than by 
reference to a fixed ceiling interest rate.38  However the fact that interest rate caps 
have been successfully applied in most member states is evidence that an appropriate 
balance can be found.  The argument of the UK government that such caps are 
inappropriate in the UK market, which has a wider variety of forms of credit than in 
continental Europe, moreover fails to take account of the operation of such caps in the 
United States. 
 
In France a measure of substantive protection for sureties is provided under statute.  
This law provides relief where there is a manifest disproportion between the goods 
and income of the surety and the amount of liability.39  Prior to this protection coming 
into force that jurisdiction also developed important protection, of a partly procedural 
nature, in the context of tort law where a bank acted contrary to good faith in failing 
to enquire whether the surety was able to carry the burden of the contract of 
suretyship.  The principle stemmed from a case in which a company director provided 
security in respect of the debts of the company, limited to 20.000.000 francs.40  The 
bank was held to have not acted in good faith since it knew or ought to have known 
that the director’s obligation was manifestly disproportionate to his income but that 
this knowledge did not restrain the bank from concluding the agreement.   
 
Germany offers substantive protection but with a high threshold.  A rich vein of case 
law has concerned sureties who have incurred lifelong debts as a result of their surety 
agreements.  Such agreements have on occasion been held to be invalid on the basis 
they contravene good morals (under the sittenwidrigkeit provision of §138 BGB).  
This provision has enabled sureties to avoid agreements that glaringly overburden 
them and where the surety’s decision making has been inhibited by undue influence, a 
lack of business experience, or psychological distress.  It is notable that not only does 
                                                 
38 DTI White Paper, Fair, Clear and Competitive, The Consumer Credit Market in the 
21st Century Cm 6040, para. 3.49 ff.  A number of reasons were given for this 
decision, including that there would be practical difficulties in implementing such a 
law in view of the sophisticated and diverse credit market in the UK and that 
excessive credit rates would be better targeted in other ways.  This view has been 
criticised by consumer credit workers and other experts in countries with existing 
interest rate caps.  For detailed criticism of this finding, and the methodology by 
which it was reached, see U. REIFNER, ‘Comments on the DTI Study: “The Effect of 
Interest Rate Controls in Other Countries” (Germany, France and US) Preliminary 
Remarks from a German Perspective’ available at 
<www.kickback.org.uk/html/files/UsuryCeilingDTI_CommentUR.pdf>, 19 
November 2004; and ‘DTI Decision on Rate Caps Slammed by International Expert’ 
<www.debt-on-our-doorstep.com>, 29 October, 2004. 
39 Loi no. 93-949 du 26 juillet 1993 relative au Code de la Consommation (Partie 
Légilsative), J.O. (Journel Officiel) no. 171, 27 July 1993, Art. L 313-10. 
40 Cass. Com. 17 June 1997, Cts. Macron c/Banque internationale pour l’Afrique 
occidentale.  For a discussion of the case see C. LEBON, ‘Vorlagebeschluss of June 
29, 1999 – The Protection of “Vulnerable Sureties” as to German, French, Belgian, 
Dutch, English and Scottish Law’ 2&3 ERPL 2001, p 417 at 425-427.   
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the law look at the substance of the contract, but that it also has regard to whether the 
surety was subject to a defect of consent.  This law therefore contains requirements 
under both Categories 3 and 4.  Contracts of suretyship are avoided on the basis that 
they interfere with the surety’s right to the development of personality and to human 
dignity,41 in that they leave the surety with no economic options other than to 
continue paying the amount for which they are liable, and that, further, they offend 
against the welfare state principle.42 
 
The high threshold for avoidance in Germany is apparent if regard is had to the nature 
of the litigation.  In contrast to the English case law, under the law of undue influence, 
the concern has been to relieve sureties who are faced with a life-long liability, rather 
than to protect the surety’s home ownership.43  A contract of suretyship that resulted 
in a loss of the family home would be tolerated under German law, since this loss 
would not be sufficient in itself to indicate that the debt glaringly overburdens the 
surety.  What instead is required is a gross disparity between the amount that the 
surety is liable for and their ability to pay the amount.  For example one typical 
German case concerned a 21 year old woman who guaranteed a 100,000DM loan in 
spite of having no prospect of ever paying that amount, since she had no job and no 
professional education.44  A more guarded approach to contractual avoidance is 
therefore apparent in Germany, perhaps reflecting a sense that the debtor should 
observe his or her obligations.   
 
Therefore there are a number of different approaches to the protection of sureties in 
the member states surveyed.  Differences are observable in the scope of the applicable 
laws, most notably in the level of substantive unfairness that is required, and, in 
addition, whether or not a defect of consent is also required.  However, as will be 
discussed below, the impact of these differences may potentially be lessened if the 
responsible lending provision of the draft Directive is implemented.45   
 
Category 5. Consumer bankruptcy 
Bankruptcy can provide an opportunity for the relief of the surety, should none of the 
other categories of protection be applicable.  However the bankruptcy of the principal 
debtor will trigger the liability of the surety so the availability of these laws may be 
both a blessing and a curse.  Very different models of consumer bankruptcy are 
observable within Europe.  As noted above, these models correlate quite strongly to 
the system of social welfare that is in operation.  It has been observed that the more 
generous the social welfare system is, the less likely it is that the debtor will be 
granted a fresh start without having to adopt a scheme the repayment of debts over a 
                                                 
41 Arts 1 I and 2 I Grundgesetz. 
42 Art. 20 I, 28 I Grundgesetz. 
43 M. SIEMS, ‘No Risk, No Fun? Should Spouses be Advised before Committing to 
Guarantees? A Comparative Analysis’ ERPL 2002, p 509 at p 520, although this 
article discusses Barclay’s Bank v. O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180, the leading case prior to 
the Etridge case, above, n. 17. 
44 BVerfGNJW 1994, 36. 
45 See the text accompanying n. 67 below. 
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number of years.46  In addition, different levels of democratisation of credit are 
observable within the European Union, with the United Kingdom at one extreme and 
the southern European member states at the other and this has led to differences in 
levels of development of bankruptcy laws in those countries. 
 
In systems linked with strong social welfare principles the emphasis is on prevention 
rather than treatment, with the consequential effect that, where prevention has failed, 
treatment is educative and largely unforgiving of debtors.  The rationale here may be 
that, if the basic needs of the individual are catered for by the state, there is no need 
for the individual to rely on credit to provide for his needs and so borrowing should 
remain at a level that is manageable.  Over-indebtedness should therefore only occur 
in cases of extravagance and, in such circumstances, it might be considered that the 
individual requires rehabilitation and assistance to repay over a longer period of time, 
and that he should not be able to escape his debts.47  It is arguably right that welfare 
based systems should take this approach since the provision of welfare produces 
perverse incentives to take excessive credit risks48 and a more generous bankruptcy 
system would exacerbate this by undermining the obligation to pay ones debts.  
However these arguments do not apply with the same force in relation to sureties who 
have only become indebted out of a sense of family loyalty. 
 
Within the European Union the Scandinavian countries follow this model.  Those 
countries employ ‘institutional social policy’49 under which the state provides a 
comprehensive income security system and, in addition, a wide range of public 
services.  In line with theories connecting the generosity of the social welfare system 
with the parsimoniousness of the bankruptcy system, these countries have what may 
be considered to be quite restrictive and, in some respects, judgmental bankruptcy 
systems.  Debtors have to overcome a number of moral thresholds in order to be 
                                                 
46 See R. EFRAT, ‘Global Trends in Personal Bankruptcy’ (2002) 76 Am. Bankr. L.J. 
(American Bankruptcy Law Journal), 2002, p 81 at 96-98 for an overview of the 
relationship; and U. REIFNER, ‘’Thou Shalt Pay Thy Debts’ Personal Bankruptcy 
Law and Inclusive Contract Law’ in J. Niemi- Kiesiläinen, I. Ramsay and W.C. 
Whitford (eds), Consumer Bankruptcy in Global Perspective, Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2003, p. 144. 
47 See for example the system in Norway, described in H. P. GRAVER, ‘Consumer 
Bankruptcy: A Right or a Privilege? The Role of the Courts in Establishing Moral 
Standards of Economic Conduct’ (1997) 20 J. Cons. Pol. (Journal of Consumer 
Policy) 1997, p 161. 
48 E. A. POSNER, ‘Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the 
Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to 
Contract’ 24 J. Legal Stud. (Journal of Legal Studies), 1995, p 283. 
49 The social policy terminology in this section is from V.-L. RITAKALLIO, ‘Trends 
of Poverty and Income Inequality in Cross-National Comparison’ 4 EJSS (European 
Journal of Social Security) 2002, p 151 at 154-156, explaining the models of social 
policy presented by W. KORPI and J. PALME, ‘Socialpolitik, kris och reformer: 
Sverige i internationell belysning’ in Nya villkor för ekonomi och politik. 
Ekonomikomissionens förslag, bilagdel 2.  Statens offentliga utredningar 1993: 16, 
Finansdepartement, Stockholm, 1993, pp. 135-170.  See also G. ESPING-
ANDERSEN, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1990. 
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eligible for relief.  These thresholds emphasise the requirement that debts should be 
paid.  The eligible debtor is given assistance in meeting his debt burden but this 
assistance takes the form of debt rescheduling, rather than debt cancelling, as in some 
other jurisdictions, such as the UK.  Indeed the bankruptcy system is to some extent 
regarded as part of the social welfare system since it provides an ‘opportunity for 
individuals to emerge from a hopeless situation of over-indebtedness without being 
physically and mentally crushed’ which is regarded as being ‘of vital importance to 
the development of the welfare society, and for the perception of safety and well-
being by the public’.50  Scandinavian debtors are therefore held to their bargains, 
although it should be remembered also that the courts have the power to police the 
substantive fairness of transactions under Category 4 and so sureties should not be 
forced into this long and restrictive bankruptcy process by an unfair agreement and 
should not be forced to continue to pay what is owed under the agreement while 
subject to the process. 
 
Conversely in a society where there are fewer welfare benefits, and family members 
are unable to assist in providing finance, more citizens have to look to the credit 
market to satisfy their basic needs.51  Thus, credit facilitates ‘the mobilisation of 
future income’.52  However in such systems the over-indebted consumer lacks 
financial support in the event of a loss of employment or some other circumstance 
leading to a dramatic drop in income, or a dramatic rise in expenditure.53  In such 
societies there is an increased risk of financial difficulties that cannot be solved by a 
scheme of organised repayments, and so there is a greater need for bankruptcy 
procedures providing a fresh start.54  It is therefore, in theory, more likely that the 
lender will request that a surety be provided, if security against the assets of the debtor 
is unavailable, and a greater risk of default by the principal debtor arises.  However 
there are also broader possibilities for the surety to make use of bankruptcy himself to 
escape his suretyship obligations.   
 
In keeping with this model, the Anglo Saxon countries operate a more restrictive 
‘means test’55 social welfare policy, in which the state plays a limited role in income 
security and the provision of services.  Individuals are more likely to be reliant on 
credit to meet their needs.  Over-indebtedness is therefore more likely to occur and 
more likely to do so through reasons that are not the fault of the debtor (although this 
                                                 
50 H. P. GRAVER, above n. 46 above, at p. 163-4, quoting the Report of the 
Norwegian Parliamentary Committee, 1991-92 at p. 3. 
51 For a detailed discussion of the need for United States citizens to rely on credit for 
the provision of health care see M. JACOBY, ‘Generosity Versus Accessibility: 
Bankruptcy, Consumer Credit and Health Care Finance in the US’ in J. Niemi- 
Kiesiläinen, I. Ramsay and W.C. Whitford (eds), n. 5 above.  
52 U. REIFNER, n. 46 above, p. 143. 
53 The United States of America provides the clearest evidence of the impact of a lack 
of welfare provision on the over-indebted consumer.  See generally T. A. 
SULLIVAN, E. WARREN and J.L. WESTBROOK, The Fragile Middle Class, Yale 
University Press, New Haven and London, 2000; and E. WARREN and A. WARREN 
TYAGI, The Two Income Trap, Basic Books, New York, 2003. 
54 Jurisdictions in this category include the UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and 
the USA. 
55 V.-L. RITAKALLIO, n. 49 above. 
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is not to suggest in any way that debtors in Scandinavian debtors are more likely to be 
delinquent).  In light of these reasons a debtor in the UK can obtain a fresh start after 
going through the bankruptcy procedure.  Another notable factor is that the UK credit 
market is highly developed within Europe, representing approximately one quarter of 
the EU credit market in general and over half of the market in credit cards in the EU.  
This high rate of development has led to reforms introduced under the Enterprise Act 
2002, under which a bankrupt debtor can obtain a fresh start after only one year.  This 
system facilitates streamlined processing of bankruptcy cases and the re-entry of the 
debtor into the credit market.  In following this system the UK has more in common 
with other countries with highly democratised credit, including the US, Australia, 
New Zealand and Canada than with other EU member states.  Indeed the UK position 
is not only different from the position in Scandinavia.  As discussed below, it 
contrasts very sharply with the position in the southern EU member states and the new 
member states in particular, which may make it difficult to identify a suitable model 
for maximum harmonisation.56 
 
Between these extremes countries are such as France, Germany and the Netherlands, 
which operate ‘corporatist’57 social welfare systems, under which social security is 
linked to employment and where services are provided by voluntary organisations, 
including the church.  Credit has not gained such a strong foothold in these countries 
as in the UK, and the bankruptcy systems are not as generous as the British, since they 
contain strong rehabilitative features.  The French system is similar to the 
Scandinavian models in that it enables debtors in good faith to reschedule the 
payment of their debts. 58  The average length of payment plans has been ten years, 
although in hopeless cases it is possible to obtain a discharge after three years.59  
Germany requires the repayment of debts during a six year period of good behaviour 
before the debtor can achieve a release from remaining debts.  During this time the 
debtor must subsist at a basic level and must take any reasonable offer of work.  The 
system in the Netherlands has encouraged rehabilitation in the form of out of court 
settlements of debts, facilitated by local authorities as an alternative to bankruptcy 
administered through the courts.60 
 
II. Draft Directive on consumer credit: potential for consumer 
protection under domestic law to impede the development of the market 
The draft Directive on consumer credit does not attend to many of the areas of 
difference that were noted above, in spite of its proposed maximum harmonisation 
approach, which would suggest it may not be fully effective in opening up the credit 
market.  A number of problems have been pointed out in existing literature, including 
                                                 
56 See the text accompanying n. 85 below. 
57 V.-L. RITAKALLIO, n. 49 above. 
58 Loi 89-1010 relative à la prevention et au règlement des difficultès liées au 
surendettement particuliers et des familles, incorporated into the Consumer Protection 
Act as Arts L.331-1 to L333-8. 
59 Loi n. 98-657 (29 July 1998). 
60 See N. HULS, N. JUNGMANN and B. NIEMEIJER, ‘Can Voluntary Settlement 
and Consumer Bankruptcy Coexist?  The Development of Dutch Insolvency Law’ in 
J. Niemi- Kiesiläinen, I. Ramsay and W.C. Whitford (eds), n. 5 above 
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not only the obvious language differences.61  The place of consumer protection as a 
potential barrier to integration of the credit market must also be evaluated.  The 
availability of protection represents a risk that creditors must take into account in 
setting the terms of their credit contracts since it provides an opportunity for the 
debtor and the surety to default or to otherwise escape their contractual obligations. 
 
Category 1 protection is likely to be of limited relevance to this consideration, 
however it does in part determine the need of consumers for credit, and it affects their 
potential to default.  In addition, social policy affects bankruptcy, which does 
represent a significant obstacle to integration.  Social welfare also indirectly affects 
enforcement through the civil procedure rules for the protection of the assets of 
debtors.   
 
The draft Directive pays most attention to Category 2 protection, perhaps because the 
regulation of Categories 3 and 4 would stray into the realm of contract law in general.  
It is therefore in this area that barriers to the expansion of the market are least likely to 
occur, although questions may be asked regarding the effectiveness of the procedural 
protection that is provided to sureties, when contrasted with protection that is 
currently provided in some member states.62   
 
Although Category 3 methods of protection, such as duress, appear in similar form in 
the jurisdictions considered, it should not be thought that the laws are so similar that 
they can be regarded as the same.  For example differences relate to whether or not 
substantive unfairness is required in addition to a defect in consent.  There is therefore 
potential for these laws to act as barriers to market expansion.  However it is arguable 
that, provided that lenders take care to ensure that the surety is provided with 
information, and that the surety both understands what they are getting into and that 
they are comfortable with it, these laws are not such that most honest lenders should 
be concerned.   
 
The differences in approach in the member states to the issue of surety protection 
could create potential difficulties for lenders in assessing the likelihood of their 
arrangements being set aside.  For example, the UK has strong Category 2 protection 
and the bulk of the case law has occurred under this Category through its undue 
influence law.  In contrast in Germany the Category 2 protection has tended to be 
more limited and the main form of surety protection occurs under Category 4 with the 
sittenwidrigkeit principle.  However, as will be seen, the role of these laws could 
change significantly in light of the ‘responsible lending’ provision of the draft, which 
supplements these laws by regulating procedural, and to some extent substantive, 
elements of the suretyship agreement. 
 
Bankruptcy represents a significant potential barrier to the opening up of the credit 
market.  Recent opportunities to bring greater uniformity to these laws have not been 
taken.  Insolvency laws have long been on the reform agenda for the European Union, 
                                                 
61 See N. JENTZSCH, above n.3, K. LANNOO and A. DE LA MATA MUÑOZ 
above n.3. 
62 For example the UK approach, noted above.  See also P. ROTT, ‘Consumer 
Guarantees in the Future Consumer Credit Directive: Mandatory Ban on Consumer 
Protection?’, in this volume. 
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as part of the creation of a single market.  Although harmonisation efforts have been 
restricted to conflict of laws provisions the open method of coordination has been 
adopted in relation to substantive insolvency laws, as part of the enterprise strategy.  
The focus under this process has been on corporate rescue procedures.  However in 
official reports under the benchmarking exercise associated with the open method of 
coordination some thought was given to the position of bankrupt entrepreneurs, and 
to the desirability of providing a fresh start to enable them to try again.  The issue of 
consumer bankruptcy was largely neglected in the review process, perhaps because 
the link with enterprise is less clear and the issues are more complex.  This omission 
may be a blessing, since consumer bankruptcies are multifaceted.  The issue is best 
considered alongside methods of resolving over-indebtedness of consumers via social 
exclusion policies and remedies available under contract law and consumer protection 
law.  It is arguably only when such mechanisms are inadequate that recourse to 
bankruptcy procedures is required by consumers.  Therefore the issue of consumer 
bankruptcies requires revisiting in light of the proposed reforms under the consumer 
protection Directive, as part of the European Council policy to tackle over-
indebtedness and as part of the social exclusion agenda,63 assuming that the powers 
which have been granted in this area are to bear fruit.64   
 
As things stand, however, the bankruptcy systems that are in operation in the 
European Union vary enormously in duration and effects.  The likelihood of default is 
a factor that lenders must take account of in setting the terms of the contract of credit.  
The comparative easiness of a debtor obtaining a fresh start in the UK represents a far 
higher risk for a lender than for example the debtor in Germany who has to observe a 
6 year payment plan before obtaining discharge, or debtors in Scandinavia who have 
to overcome a number of conditions if they are worthy of debt rescheduling in 
bankruptcy.65  However it is submitted that the stigma of bankruptcy will prevent it 
being used by sureties as an easy way out and the number of bankruptcies is unlikely 
to rise to an extent where this procedure becomes destigmatised.  Moreover, the 
responsible lending provision could potentially mean that sureties do not become so 
overburdened that bankruptcy should be considered as a serious solution.  
Nonetheless, suitable bankruptcy provisions should be provided so that consumers 
have an option in cases where the responsible lending provision does not assist. 
 
III. Draft Directive on consumer credit: potential impact on existing 
categories of consumer protection 
Having considered the categories of protection, and the extent to which they represent 
unharmonised obstacles to the development of the credit market, it is now necessary 
to consider how the draft Directive, as it currently stands, will affect the scope of 
                                                 
63 EC Treaty, Art. 136. 
64 For a criticisms of the approach to social exclusion see P. SCHOUKENS, ‘How the 
European Union Keeps the Social Welfare Debate on Track: A Lawyer’s View of the 
EU Instruments Aimed at Combating Social Exclusion’ 4 EJSS 2002, p 117 at 118. 
65 See J. NIEMI- KIESILÄINEN, ‘Consumer Bankruptcy in Comparison: Do We 
Cure a Market Failure or a Social Problem?’ 37 Osgoode Hall LJ 1999, p 473 at 488 - 
497.  See also H.P. GRAVER, above n. 47, describing Norway’s system. 
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protection for European Union sureties, and other consumers.66  Selected key issues 
will be discussed. 
 
Responsible lending 
As noted above the protection for sureties could potentially be bolstered in future if 
the provision on responsible lending contained in the draft Directive on consumer 
credit is implemented.67  This protection, depending on how it is interpreted, has the 
potential to eliminate some of the current differences in protection due to member 
states emphasising particular categories of protection for sureties.  As it presently 
stands68 this provision includes obligations to sureties, since it is intended to apply to 
all consumers.  It requires the lender and any intermediary to adhere to the 
requirement of pre contractual information, for the creditor to assess the consumer’s 
creditworthiness by consulting a database, and, in good time before the consumer is 
bound by the credit agreement, to provide the consumer, on paper, with necessary and 
essential information regarding the transaction, including any sureties that are 
required.  This provision, in requiring an assessment of the creditworthiness of both 
the borrower, and the surety, has the potential to supplement the protection noted 
above, for example under the English law of undue influence which takes a 
procedural approach, confined mainly to the provision of advice.  The responsible 
lending provision might potentially go further, as it could also entail a need for the 
courts to assess the reasonableness of what the surety has agreed to.  In addition the 
new law could bolster the laws of other jurisdictions, such as Germany, where lenders 
have been able to impose disproportionate liabilities except where sureties can 
demonstrate that this is contrary to good morals and where, in consequence, the scope 
for avoidance has been quite narrow.  These effects will of course depend on the 
provision, firstly, making it into the final Directive in a form which places significant 
requirements on the lender and, secondly, on the provision being interpreted in a 
consistently generous fashion by judges in the member states.  A danger is that judges 
in the member states, in interpreting the new law, will be influenced by their existing 
norms.  It has been observed by Fehlberg, commentating on an Australian statute on 
surety protection, that legal change is made difficult when ‘those implementing the 
law are trapped in a custom of interpretation which leads them to impose caveats on 
relief which do not exist in the statute itself’.69  In addition, since this provision does 
not at present expressly indicate an ability to regulate the substance of transactions it 
                                                 
66 See also P. ROTT, n. 62 above for detailed discussion of the potential impact of the 
Directive. 
67 2004 Draft of Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Directive 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Harmonisation of the Laws, 
Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States concerning credit 
for consumers, Art. 5 (previous draft Art. 9). 
68 Taken from the Institute for Financial Services Hamburg, ‘Consolidated Version 
and Comments on the Amendments to the Proposal for a Directive on the 
harmonisation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member 
States concerning credit for consumers repealing Directive 87/102/EC and modifying 
Directive 93/13/EC of October 2004 (2002/0216 (COD))’, Hamburg 5 November 
2004. 
69 B. FEHLBERG, Sexually Transmitted Debt, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997, p. 
280-1, citing Kirby P in AGC v. West [1986] NSWLR 610, at p. 616. 
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is likely that in any case law that is brought under the provision, lenders will lobby for 
a restriction of the scope of protection within the bright lines of Category 2.   
 
Ample evidence of attempts by lenders to use law reforms to argue that the scope of 
surety protection should be limited can be seen in a recent case from Germany.  In 
this case, the sittenwidrigkeit provision came under fire in light of the introduction of 
new bankruptcy laws on 1st January 1999, with critics arguing that, since a debtor can 
free himself from his debts by going through the process of six years of good 
behaviour,70 it is not necessary for the courts to intervene on grounds that the contract 
is contrary to good morals.71  The sittenwidrigkeit jurisdiction was however upheld by 
the court, primarily in light of the different functions of these categories of debtor 
protection.72  One important factor was that, while the sittenwidrigkeit jurisdiction 
related to the time at which the contract was concluded, the debt release procedure in 
bankruptcy, being six years in duration, represented a pedantic and lengthy means of 
debt relief.  Bankruptcy served a completely different function, structurally, from the 
sittenwidrigkeit jurisdiction.73   
 
This decision reflects a principled approach, based on an identification of the function 
of the different categories of surety protection.  Arguably it could provide a suitable 
model for future cases in which the impact of the draft Directive on the scope of 
existing protection is at issue.  Bankruptcy, in view of its consequences, should be 
viewed as the last resort for over-indebted consumers, including sureties.  These 
procedures enable over-indebted persons to either manage their debts more 
favourably, or to achieve a fresh start through the cancelling of debts, so that they 
may regain control over their finances.  In cases where the cause of over-indebtedness 
is a transaction that offends the principles on which the remedies under Categories 2, 
3 and 4 are based, and this could include the responsible lending provision, 
bankruptcy should not be regarded as an alternative to contractual avoidance – each 
has a different aim and so should only be used where the circumstances are 
appropriate.  If the suretyship transaction is flawed it should be capable of avoidance 
in spite of the fact that the surety can avail himself of bankruptcy proceedings to 
manage or shed the debt.  Bankruptcy carries with it negative consequences, such as 
the duration of the procedure and significant stigma (even if unintended by the 
legislature) and so sureties should not be forced in that direction. 
 
Socially harmful lending 
Although the increased availability of different types of consumer credit can have 
positive aspects it is important in the interests of both principal debtors and sureties 
that it should not facilitate the expansion of the activities of the worst types of lenders, 
including loan sharks.  Good usury laws can help in this regard.  However it is also 
important for consumers who would normally be likely customers of such lenders to 
have alternative sources of finance, such as credit unions.  It is important that these 
                                                 
70 §§ 286 ff Insolvenzordnung. 
71 See for example MEDICUS, JuS 1999, 833 [835]; RELLERMEYER, WuB I F 1 C 
1.03; KRUEGER, MDR 2002, 856 m.w. Nachw. 
72 OLG Frankfurt am Main, judgment of 24 March 2004 – 23 U 65/03.  
73 For criticism of this decision see D. UNGAR, EwiR §138 BGB 4/04, 691. 
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forms of credit should not be damaged by the extension of the credit market.  
Therefore aggressive marketing of credit should be controlled. 
 
Remedies  
Not only do the member states currently approach the protection of sureties in 
different ways but also the end results of surety protection cases are variable.  One 
very striking difference is that in the UK the more common form of litigation relates 
to sureties who are seeking to protect the family home that is the subject of a mortgage 
or charge on behalf of the lender.  In civil law jurisdictions, other than Scotland, this 
focus on the home is lacking and the case law concentrates on the general amount 
owing, in particular if the surety is facing a lifelong debt.74  The level of protection is 
therefore, in this respect, broader in the UK, a surprising trend that is at odds with the 
‘creditor friendly’ image of the country.  However, since the UK law concentrates on 
whether the correct procedures have been followed by the lender, rather than on the 
substantive fairness of the transaction, there may in practice be no more chance of 
avoiding an unfair but procedurally well planned suretyship agreement than in civil 
law countries, although of course a surety in the UK can use the last resort of 
bankruptcy more easily than continental European debtors.  A further difference is 
that while continental European protection generally provides that the offending 
provision is void, under UK law it is possible for the court to adjust the contract to 
remove the only the wrongful elements of the contract,75 although it is also possible 
for the whole contract to be set aside.76  Although this possibility would seem to allow 
the courts to offer less protection to the surety, the danger with a wholly void/valid 
approach is that it encourages conservatism among judges who wish to preserve the 
principle that contracts must be observed (pacta sunt servanda). 
 
The issue of remedies is not dealt with under the present draft of the Directive, 
therefore, as the it currently stands, the remedies will be for the member states to 
determine.  There will, therefore, be continued scope for divergence in the laws, until 
such time as a ruling of the ECJ on the matter.  It would be desirable to deal with the 
matter expressly to minimise the need for clarifying case law. 
 
Potential increase in over-indebtedness  
A recent European Council document on social exclusion77 identified the prevention 
and treatment of over-indebtedness as a major element in the fight against social 
exclusion and poverty.  However the draft Directive has the potential to undermine 
this fight.  A worst case scenario is that the elimination of barriers to consumer credit 
provision in Europe will lead to an increase in over-indebtedness with consequences 
for both principal debtors and sureties.  The ‘democratisation’ of credit, as noted 
above, is a factor that, in other jurisdictions, including, within the EU, the United 
Kingdom, has led to a need for bankruptcy procedures to be relaxed.  Greater 
                                                 
74 For a comparison see generally M. SIEMS, above, n 43.   
75 Barclay’s Bank plc v. O’Brien [1994] 1 AC 180, HL.  Under German law there is 
some scope for partial nullity of offending contracts: BGB §139. 
76 TSB v. Canfield [1995] 1 All ER 551. 
77 Joint Report by the Commission and the Council on Social Exclusion, Brussels 5 
March 2004, 7101/04. 
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competition in the credit market leads to more affordable credit, more accessible 
credit and more effective marketing of products.  Consumers are therefore better able 
to borrow more capital and they are more likely to do so, in particular if lenders 
emphasise positive aspects of credit and downplay negative aspects.  This behaviour 
may lead to over-indebtedness.  Things that were no longer affordable become within 
the reach of consumers and consumers become more willing to take financial risks to 
attain what that they covet.   
 
It is necessary to consider the wider financial context.  Three types of over-
indebtedness have been identified in the literature.78  Active over-indebtedness occurs 
where the consumer has mismanaged his financial affairs, by overestimating his 
future income or overspending.  It is this form of over-indebtedness that is facilitated 
by the democratisation of credit.  Passive over-indebtedness describes the situation 
where the cause of over-indebtedness is a life event that occurs independently of the 
debtor’s decisions.  Potential over-indebtedness, is caused by a poor economic 
situation that is not going to change, such as low pension payments or where an adult 
aged 30 or more has yet to become economically active.  These latter two types of 
over-indebtedness are affected by social welfare policies.  Therefore, where this 
democratisation is accompanied by a shrinkage in welfare provision, as is happening 
in some member states of the European Union, rates of over-indebtedness are likely to 
rise further, with knock-on effects for sureties.  There is therefore a need for 
bankruptcy procedures to be reviewed in light of both in light of the increased 
democratisation of credit but also with any changes in welfare provision in mind.  The 
relationship is neatly encapsulated by Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook: ‘The data 
suggest that the need for a more protective consumer bankruptcy law is directly 
proportional to the size of the social safety net and the availability of consumer credit.  
Like any good three-legged stool, change the length of one leg and the shift will be 
felt by the other two.’79 
 
In systems where significant democratisation of credit has already occurred the 
legislatures have responded by reviewing their bankruptcy laws so that the increased 
number of over-indebted consumers can be accommodated.  Such reforms have 
already taken place in many European countries, following the deregulation of their 
credit markets in the 1980s.80  This deregulation enabled previously unmet demand 
for credit to be satisfied and massive increases in consumer lending occurred, most 
notably in the UK, where, between the years 1986 to 1997, lending increased from 
£30,150 million to £77,548 million.81  It is estimated that the total volume of 
outstanding consumer credit doubled in many other member states.82  Problems 
occurred when the recession in the 1990s took its toll on the over-indebted through 
                                                 
78 This terminology is from Adiconsum, Il Soveraindebitamento della famiglie- 
Definizioni, profili e dimensioni di un fenomeno sommerso M. Fiasco, Regione 
Basilicata/Campagna informative dell’Adiconsum/ UE DG XXIV (1999), quoted in 
G. BETTI et al, Study of the Problem of Consumer Indebtedness: Statistical Aspects, 
OCR Macro, London, 2001 and N. JENTZSCH, above n. 3 at p. 12. 
79 T. SULLIVAN et al, above n. 53 at. 259. 
80 See R. EFRAT, above n. 5, at p. 92-3, citing the examples of Finland, Norway, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and France. 
81 T. SULLIVAN et al, above n. 53, at 258. 
82 J. NIEMI- KIESILÄINEN, above n.65, at p. 480. 
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factors such as redundancies, a drop in house prices, small business failures and the 
consequential liabilities of guarantors of business loans.  Existing welfare provision 
was insufficient to cope with these shocks and so demand grew for a way of assisting 
consumers to cope.  Therefore bankruptcy procedures were introduced in many 
member states to assist individuals in difficulty.83  As noted above, in northern 
Continental Europe these procedures were regarded as being a part of the welfare 
provision: they enabled debtors to manage their burden through counselling.84  In 
contrast the UK to some extent followed the United States model in allowing a fresh 
start after a period of bankruptcy, formerly three years but now as low as one year. 
 
This pattern did not occur in the same way throughout the EU, however.  In a number 
of jurisdictions, most notably those in the Mediterranean region, the process only 
happened later, largely on account of cultural factors.  For example in Portugal the 
expansion of consumer credit occurred comparatively recently, although this 
expansion was dramatic, with family indebtedness increasing from 20% in 1990 to 
95% in 2001.  Consumer bankruptcy procedures were therefore not formerly required 
but a need for them has grown alongside the rise in indebtedness.85  A similar 
situation is observable in many of the countries that acceded to the EU in 2004.86 
 
Although member states should keep their bankruptcy procedures under review if the 
draft Directive is implemented, it is unlikely that all systems will need to adapt to the 
British model, provided that currently strong features of consumer lending in 
particular member states can be preserved.  For example the availability of overdrafts 
for German debtors has meant that credit cards, one of the most common forms of 
lending in countries with high levels of over-indebtedness, have gained less of a 
foothold in that country.  If this situation continues, German debtors should be better 
placed to avoid over-indebtedness.  Creditors in some other member states may be 
insulated, for other reasons, such as resistant attitudes of consumers to indebtedness. 
 
A further form of protection which member states may have to review in light of the 
proposed Directive is consumer credit education, with the aim that consumers will 
thereby be able to make more informed choices in choosing credit.  Two theories have 
                                                 
83 See for example T. SULLIVAN et al, above n. 53, at p. 258-9; and R. MASON, 
‘Consumer Bankruptcies: An Australian Perspective’ 37 Osgoode Hall LJ 1999, p 
449 at 458. 
84 Therefore a contrast may be drawn with the United States system which enables a 
debtor who has failed to have a fresh start and re-enter the credit market: Bankruptcy 
Laws Commission, Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United 
States H.R. Doc. No. 93-173 (1973).  See further J. NIEMI- KIESILÄINEN, above n. 
82, at 476-482 for a comparison of the approaches. 
85 M. M. LEITÃO MARQUES and C. FRADE, ‘Searching for an Over-indebtedness 
Regulatory System for Portugal and the European Union’ in J. Niemi- Kiesiläinen et 
al (eds), above n. 46 at p. 121.   
86 For example in Hungary there was previously no need for bankruptcy procedures 
since banks only lent money to consumers with adequate resources however this 
position has changed with the introduction of credit cards: A. CSŐKE, ‘Problems 
Related to Collective Insolvency Proceedings Having Cross-Border Effects From the 
Perspective of Hungary’ 13 Int. Insol. Rev. 2004, p 77 at 81. 
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been identified as underlying such schemes.87  Firstly it is thought that consumers are 
empowered by the provision of financial skills and the ability to engage in financial 
planning to achieve their goals.  Secondly it is considered that consumers are imbued 
with social control so that they are more likely to consider carefully the terms of the 
credit that they are being offered, and so they will be less likely to be swayed by 
manipulative sales techniques.  Education can also be aimed at sureties to ensure that 
they realise the consequences of what suretyship entails.  However in Europe 
extensive debtor education efforts tend to be aimed at persons who have become 
bankrupt, rather than consumers in general.  Therefore the aim of such education is to 
prevent repeated over-indebtedness and bankruptcies, to achieve rehabilitation and a 
change in lifestyle and thereby to increase the amounts that the debtor is able to pay to 
his creditors.88  If the market is expanded in the manner envisaged by the draft 
Directive it might be necessary to provide debtors with information about new forms 
of credit that they may encounter, in order to enable them to determine the advantages 
and disadvantages of what they are being offered and to compare them with other 
forms of credit that may be more appropriate to their needs. 
 
Conclusion 
The member states approach the task of surety protection in different ways, leading to 
laws which, although similar, are not identical.  These differences potentially 
represent barriers to the integration of the consumer credit market.  The draft 
Directive on consumer credit will introduce a greater level of uniformity, although it 
does not attend to all forms of surety protection.  The responsible lending provision, 
depending on its final form, and how it is ultimately interpreted by the courts, can 
potentially overcome some of the existing barriers.  If it is to achieve this task the 
scope of this proposed provision, and its available remedies, needs to be more clearly 
articulated.  Further challenges also lie ahead in ensuring that the draft Directive does 
not lead to an expansion of socially harmful forms of credit and an increase in over-
indebtedness.  The reforms do not directly impact on social welfare policies and 
bankruptcy laws, which have important effects on the scope of consumer protection.  
However attention must be paid to those categories of protection if the credit market 
does expand.  
 
                                                 
87 See J. BRAUCHER, ‘Debtor Education in Bankruptcy: The Perspective of Interest 
Analysis’ in J. Niemi- Kiesiläinen et al (eds), above n. 46, at p. 319. 
88 J. NIEMI- KIESILÄINEN, ‘The Role of Consumer Counselling as Part of the 
Bankruptcy Process in Europe’ 37 Osgoode Hall LJ 1999, p 409 at 413.  The UK 
government initially intended to include debtor counselling in the reforms to 
bankruptcy law that were implemented under the Enterprise Act 2002 but dropped the 
idea when it failed to gain support in a consultation exercise on the proposals.  One 
disadvantage of debtor counselling is the increase in the cost of proceedings that is 
entailed.  It is therefore to some extent inconsistent with the streamlined UK system 
introduced under the 2002 Act. 
